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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NONA W. WATSON * 
Plaintiff and Appellant * 
vs. * Case No. 14 652 
NORMAN A. WATSON * 
Defendant and Respondent * 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Respondent seeks to affirm the judgment and decision of 
the District Court of Cache County, State of Utah. 
ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Defendant-Respondent shall be referred to herein as the 
Defendant and the Plaintiff-Appellant shall be referred to herein 
as the Plaintiff* 
The Defendant concurs generally with the statement of facts by 
the Plaintiff. However, several additional facts may be stated 
to advise the Court of those facts in the Defendant's favor. 
The parties in this action were married for approximately 
32 years. During this period of time, it would appear that there 
were serious disagreements betv/een the parties and separations at 
various times. The parties both indicated that the property ac-
quired presently was as a result of joint efforts between the oar-
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ties during the course of their marriage. 
However, during the course of their marriage, the Defendant has 
conveyed property to the Plaintiff for the purpose of effectuating 
reconciliations. 
This was true with the hone in Rexburg which was used for the 
down payment on the home in Logan. 
With respect to the bank accounts of the parties, it appears 
that the Plaintiff in her statement of facts, states that she has 
a bank account which is her property and that they have a joint bank 
account which is jointly owned property and therefore, she alleges 
that what is in her name is hers and what is in the joint name 
is half hers and what is in her husband's name alone and in his pos-
session is also half hers. Such a statement is not uncommonly made 
by a wife in a divorce proceeding. However, the background facts 
indicate that the Defendant was employed in Shiprock, New Mexico 
as a teacher and has an income of approximately $18,000.00 per year 
and that Plaintiff is also a teacher and has been employed over the 
past 14-1/2 years as a teacher and was employed at the time of this 
trial by Box Slder High School at an annual salary of $14,400.00 
per year. She claims disability. However, the transcript indi-
cates that she still has a potential income pending termination of 
her disability and so it would appear that from a fair reading of 
the transcript, both of the parties can be gainfully employed, both 
of the parties have contributed to the funds held by the parties 
whether the funds are held in one namt= or jointly held and the judg-
ment of the Court was based upon these facts* -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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The Court also heard evidence to the effect that the Plaintiff 
had in her possession approximately $2,000.00 worth of Indian Jewelry 
and that the Defendant had in his possession approximately $6,000.00 
worth of Indian Jewelry and $1,700.00 cash; that the Court awarded 
$2,000.00 cash to the Plaintiff in addition to the $2,000.00 she 
had in order to effect an equal distribution of the Indian Jewelry 
and the Defendant's cash. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN AWARDING 
ALIMONY TO PLAINTIFF. 
Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, states 
as follows: 
"When a decree of divorce is made, the Court may make such 
orders in relation to the children, property and parties and 
the maintenance of the parties and children as may be equit-
able.5' 
The legislature in enacting this section recognized that the 
Courts have a wide latitude in the division of property so long 
as such distributions are equitable in nature. 
The Courts have reflected this theory for many years. The case 
of Stewart vs. Stewart, Utah, 242 P.2d 947, decided in 192 6, stands 
for the following proposition: 
' " It is now the settled lav; and practice of this Court 
that while a large discretion is vested in the trial 
Courts in applying the provisions of the foregoing sta-
tute and in making the distribution of property yet 
such discretion is not an arbitrary one, but is a 
sound, legal discretion and is subject to review by 
this Court. This Court is also firmly committed to 
the doctrine that the judgments and orders of the 
trial Court in awarding alimony or in making dis-
tribution of property will not be interferred with 
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unless it is made to appear with at least reasonable 
certainty that the discretion vested in those Courts 
has been abused to the prejudice of an Appellant 
in some particular or particulars." 
In the case of Bader vs. Bader, 424 P.2d 150, IS U.2d 407, 
the Supreme Court .in affirming then District Judge, A.H. Ellett said, 
:
'It would lead to intolerable instability of judgments 
if this Court should assume the prerogative and accept 
the responsibility of merely second guessing a trial 
Judge who has done a conscientious job of attempting 
to make a just and equitable allocation of the property 
and income of the parties in regards to alimony and 
support money as the trial appears to have done here. 
It is due to this fact, taken into consideration with 
the nature of the trial judge's authority and duty 
and his advantage position that in such matters he 
is allowed a comparatively wide latitude of discre-
tion which will not be disturbed in the absence of 
clear abuse. A circumstance which we have found 
here. Judgment affirmed." 
The facts of this case indicate that the Plaintiff and the 
Defendant has been married for many years; that the children of 
the parties were grown and not living with the parties. The Def-
endant earns approximately $13,000. ,00 to $19,000.00 per year 
and that the Plaintiff has income of approximately $14,400.00 
per year when working. 
The record shows, as is conceded in Plaintiff's brief, that 
the property owned by the parties was acquired during their mar-
riage by both parties working full time. The Trial Court was spared :-
the questions of child custody, child support and division of 
property as it might relate to or for the benefit of the children. 
The sole question being before the Court was the division of 
the property between the parties. 
The record reflects the disability of the Plaintiff or Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the lack thereof. (See cross examination of Plaintiff), which the 
trial Court had the opportunity to witness and take into consid-
eration in making the division of property. The Plaintiff would 
have the Supreme Court believe that all of the Plaintiff's injuries 
are attributable to harsh treatment by the Defendant. However, 
the record shows that her latest injury was caused by falling 
on the ice, and which was anticipated to be a temporary injury 
only, as she anticipated going back to work at her chosen occupation 
of a school teacher. 
Plaintiff cites the case of DeRose vs. DeRose, 19 U.2d 77,426 
P.2d 221, (1967). This case is inapplicable because there were 
minor children that the Court had to contend with in allocating 
the property to the wife to enable her to raise the children. See 
the case of Wilson vs. Wilson, 5 U.2d 79, 296 P.2d 977, where the 
Court said as follows: 
"It is necessary for the Court to consider in addition to 
the relative guilt or innocence of the parties, an apprais-
al of all the attendent facts and circumstances: the dur-
ation of the marriage; the ages of the parties; their so-
cial positions and standards of living; their health; 
the consideration relative to the children; the money and 
property they possess and how it was acquired; the cap-
abilities and training and their present potential in-
comes .f: 
The Wilson case is demonstrative of the lengths the Supreme 
Court has gone to uphold judgments of the Trial Court which on 
their face appear to be grossly unjust to one party or the other. 
The trial Court in the instant case recognized that both parties 
had worked during their married life; that the property was acquired 
during their marriage, not withstanding the fact that certain pro-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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perty was vested in the name of the Plaintiff alone. The trial 
Court apparently concluded, the Plaintiff!s incapacity was not as 
serious as claimed by her and that she was capable of presently 
of providing for herself through a teaching contract held by her 
with a local school sys"cen. 
The Plaintiff derived the benefit of appreciation on the home 
and the reduction in the mortgage balance due, together with the 
income tax deductions* Certainly all of these benefited the Plaintiff, 
y^t are unrecognized by her in her plea of poverty to this Court. 
Such matters were, however, before the Trial Court and considered 
by the trial Court in making the award. 
See the Utah case of Allen vs. Allen 109 U. 99, 165 P.2d 872, 
where the Court said, 
"An Appellate Court cannot remain the Court of appeals 
and invite a review of every case decided by a lower 
tribunal where its judgment fails to satisfy one or 
both parties to the litigation." 
Numerous citations to the record could be made, however,the 
Defendant represents to this Court that a fair and impartial reading 
of the entire transcript and not the citation of an answer out: of 
a context, nor a short colloquy between the witness and the counsel 
will demonstrate that the trial Court's decision reflects the trial 
Court's consideration of all the evidence submitted by the parties 
and is a reasonable and fair decision* See the case of Slaughter vs. 
Slaughter, 13 U.2d 274, 421 p.2d 503. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DIDN'T ERROR IN REFUSING TO REOPEN THE 
CASE TO ALLOW APPELLANT TO SUBMIT ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE, THE DIVISION 
OF THE PROPERTY. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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One of the most rewarding experiences in the practice of 
lav; is the submission to the Court of a question on appeal. The 
decision of the Court vindicating a position taken is gratifying. 
However, the Court's failure to reverse an alleged error in trial 
Court or the reversing of the favorable trial Court judgment is 
part of our continuing legal education. Therefore, in answer 
to Point II, the Defendant's attorney submits the case of Lloyd 
Lei^ is, Plaintiff and Respondent vs. Lynn S. Porter, dba Lynn S. 
Porter Housemovers, Inc, Defendant and Appellant, #14486, filed 
November 1, 1976. It is conceded that Lewis vs. Porter was not 
a divorce case. However, the question is the same: Which is 
whether or not a trial Court can refuse to hear additional evi-
dence not offered by the parties at the time of the trial upon 
motion to reopen. This Court said the following: 
"The Defendant had ample opportunity to produce his books 
and records to indicate his version of the transaction with 
Plaintiff and to be present at trial. We discover no 
basis to ascribe abuse or discretion to the denial of the 
motion to reopen." 
The only material factual difference is that Plaintiff could 
cite to distinguish the cases is that Defendant was unrepresented 
by counsel until a day or two before trial. Such lack of representation 
does not prevent the submission of interrogatories, request for 
admissions, taking depositions, all of-which provide the Plaintiff 
with a vehicle for judgment in its favor UDon the failure of the 
Defendant to answer interrogatories or admissions. 
As in the Lewis vs. Porter case, it would appear that all 
of the evidence now sought by the Plaintiff to be introduced was 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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in her possession before, during and after the trial and she s 
should not now be heard to say that she did not have the ability 
and opportunity to present the evidence to the Court as she knew 
of the issues relating to the division of property prior to the time 
of the trial * 
III. THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT IS ItoT- MANIFESTLY UNFAIR 
AND INEQUITABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THEREBY PERMITTING THIS 
COURT TO GRANT RELIEF. 
The Defendant in this case, certainly takes no issue with the 
citations of the following cases by the Plaintiff, to-wit: 
Allen vs. Allen, 65 P.2d 872, Dahlberg vs. Dahlberg 77 U.2d 
157, 292 P. 214, Hendricks vs. Hendricks, 31 U 553, 63 P.2d 277, 
Hansen vs. Hansen 537 P.2d 491, and Mitchell vs. Mitchell 527 P.2d 
1359f for the reasons that each of these cases either announce or 
reiterate the proposition that this Court will not disturb the judg-
ment of a trial Court unless there is a clear abuse of discretion; 
that the evidence preponderates against the findings or that there 
was a misapplication or misunderstanding of the law resulting in 
prejudicial error. 
However, the Plaintiff, in paragraph 13 of her brief, introduces 
to this Court evidence, not brought forth in the trial, that there 
was more than $17,000.00 worth of silver and torquoise owned by the 
parties. The Plaintiff seeks to have this unsworn; unintroduced 
evidence given the same credibility as the evidence introduced in 
Court. The credibility so established Plaintiff seeks to have this 
Court now accept that evidence and award to Plaintiff the home of the 
parties by reason of the fact that Plaintiff has alleged, though Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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not proven, ownership of additional Indian jewelry by the Defendant. 
This argument reduced to its sixnpliest denominator is an assertion 
by Plaintiff that she can create additional evidence by stating 
facts in her brief, unsupported by the record, to be given the same 
weight as other evidence introduced in testimony for the purpose 
of achieving a reversal by this Court. 
The Plaintiff cites the case of Allen vs. Allen, 165 P.2d 872, 
as authority for the proposition that where a Court arbitrarily 
refuses to entertain credible evidence then the Court's findings 
and decree should be vacated and set aside. However, Plaintiff's 
argument fails on the premise that Plaintiff never offered nor 
introduced the evidence although the evidence was available to and 
in the possession of the Plaintiff at the time of trial and, there-
fore, the Court never refused no entertain the evidence at the 
trial. 
One of the latest pronouncements of this Court relative to 
matters of discretion of the Court is the case of Baker vs. Baker 
decided by this Court in June of 1976 and cited as 551 P.2nd 1263 
(No Utah citation available at this time). 
Justice Maughan in that case reinteriated the Court's oft 
times statement as follows: 
"In a divorce action the Court has considerable latitutde 
and discretion in adjusting financial and property in-
erests. Plaintiff has not sustained his burden to prove 
that there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the 
law resulting in a substantial and prejudicial error or the 
evidence clearly preponderated against the findings or 
such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest the 
clear abuse of discretion." 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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C O N C L U S I O I T 
Divorce actions are unique legal actions. Each one possessed 
of its own facts, circumstances, problems, emotions and persona-
lities. 
When the romance of a marriage has gone, the parties generally 
look to the security they may derive from the acquisition of the 
assets of the parties and if the severing of marital relations 
does not cause trauma, certainly the division of the property 
through litigation will cause trauma* Counsel may also become 
emotionally involved in the predicaments of their client, losing 
the detached reflection which is necessary in divorce cases* Judges 
provide the system with the stability to make an equitable division 
of the property of the parties and in many instances, the criticism 
of the Judges is a result of the lack of the detached reflection 
by tlie party making the criticism. There are no winners, only 
losers in any divorce action. 
In this case, the parties are mature people, the family raised. 
each demonstrating the capacity to earn a living. However, it 
appears that the Plaintiff is presently and temporarily disabled, 
but is anticipating partial or full employment. She has the capa-
city and intellectual ability to provide for herself as does the 
Defendant. 
The parties have acquired all of the property they now possess. 
Some of it is in Plaintiff's name alone, some is in joint tenancy, 
some of it is in the Defendant's name alone. The parties are free 
from the more difficult issues of child custody, child support, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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alimony to the working and non working wife who cares for minor 
children and the payment of large debts which encumber future 
income. The trial Court apparently viewed the Plaintiff and Defendant 
as equals standing before the law, each with an ability to support 
themselves and taking into consideration, the Plaintiff's present 
predicament of an injury resulting from a self-afflicted fall on 
the ice. 
Women have for years sought equality in Court. The consti-
tution of the State of Utah demands equality between the sexes, as 
does the Federal Constitution. Various legislation including the 
Equal Rights Amendment has sought to demand this equality. The 
Judge in making the division of the property apparently recognized 
the equality in the sexes and attempted to effectuate an equal 
division of the property based upon the facts and information 
he had before him. To this the Plaintiff bitterly comnlains, stating 
that she has been treated unfairly; that the alimony is too low; 
that she cannot exist; that the home must be divided upon her re-
marriage. If the Court were to grant Defendant's property to 
Plaintiff and Plaintifffs property to Defendant, the Plaintiff 
would again allege the inequality of the Judgment. 
The Plaintiff desires an award of the entire equity in the 
home being approximately $48,000.00; $600.00 a month alimony, 
which would be $7,200.00 per year alimony, leaving the Defendant 
v/ith a job for a few years teaching school, $3,000 worth of Indian 
jewelry, 1/2 of the cash derived from the sale of the motor home 
and personal effects. This, then is the Plaintiff's understanding Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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facts introduced in evidence, logic, reason, and equity. The 
Plaintiff seeks to become a sweepstakes winner in an action where 
there are only losers and no winners. 
Members of the Court, the Defendant submits to you the entire 
transcript in this case and asks only that this Court measure 
the facts against the yardstick of prior decisions, untaunted 
by the emotionalism of the parties and their lack of perception 
because of their personal association with the litigation. 
Respectfully submitted this 7 day of November, 1976. 
•Lll 
ton 
Attorney/ for Defendant and Respondent 
^^j^^ua^L^uf^ 
•George Wy Pres
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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